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Abstract We analyze participation in medical prevention
with an expected utility model that is sufficiently rich to
capture diverging features of different prevention proce-
dures. The predictions of the model are not rejected with
data from SHARE. A decrease in individual health
decreases participation in breast cancer screening and
dental prevention and increases participation in influenza
vaccination, cholesterol screening, blood pressure screen-
ing, and blood sugar screening. Positive income effects are
most pronounced for dental prevention. Increased mortality
risk is an important predictor in the model for breast cancer
screening, but not for the other procedures. Targeted
screening and vaccination programs increase participation.
Keywords Screening  Vaccination  Prevention 
Expected utility  Behavioral economics
JEL Classification D81  I12
Introduction
Medical prevention, e.g., vaccination and screening, has
become increasingly important in the health care systems
of advanced countries. Health practitioners are concerned
about the relatively low participation rates, even for pre-
vention measures that are generally considered to be cost-
effective (such as influenza vaccination for the elderly and
breast cancer screening for women between 50 and
69 years old). A careful look at this participation pattern
reveals huge interindividual and intercountry differences.
Moreover, participation also varies widely between dif-
ferent procedures for the same individuals.
Our main contribution to the literature is that we integrate
existing evidence on participation in medical prevention.
We test a rich model to see how different prevention pro-
cedures produce different results based on a variety of
individual characteristics. First, the model compares both
primary and secondary prevention. The former refers to
interventions that aim at avoiding or reducing the occurrence
of a disease (e.g., vaccination), and the latter to measures
that aim at reducing the health consequences of a disease by
detection and treatment in its early stages (e.g., cancer
screening). Second, we distinguish between fatal (e.g.,
cancer) and non-fatal (e.g., dental caries) diseases. Third,
our model takes individual health into account when ana-
lyzing why a patient chooses certain prevention procedures
for certain diseases. In some cases, individuals may care
more about the specific disease when their background
health is worse (e.g., influenza), in other cases they may care
more when their background health is better (e.g., dental
caries). We show how these various possibilities change the
comparative statics of the prevention decision and test the
differential predictions with data from the Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).
We stay in the tradition of the expected utility approach
to study individual preventive medical behavior (see,
amongst others: [9, 16, 28, 40]), but we introduce a broad
specification of utility (going beyond income and health)
and interpret the parameters as individual-specific
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perceptions of reality. Indeed, taking a test imposes not
only monetary (and time) costs, but also a psychological
burden, which, according to the available surveys on
motivations, may be crucial in explaining variations in
preventive care participation (see, e.g., [37]). Moreover,
while the literature has shown that subjective probabilities
influence individual decisions, it has also become clear that
the subjective risk perceptions covary only very partially
with objective risk factors [8].
In our empirical work, we focus on six cases: breast
cancer screening, dental caries screening, influenza vacci-
nation, cholesterol screening, blood pressure screening, and
blood sugar screening. These six procedures cover the
range of interesting possibilities suggested by our model.
We estimate probit models with the pooled data of the first
two waves of SHARE. There have been previous empirical
studies analyzing partly the same prevention procedures
with SHARE data ([18, 22, 29] for influenza vaccination);
([18, 42, 43] for mammography); ([20, 21] for dental care).
To the best of our knowledge, we present the first attempt
to compare the results for the different procedures within a
coherent theoretical approach, testing specific hypotheses
about the differential comparative static effects. In accor-
dance with the estimation strategies in Wu¨bker [42] for
breast cancer screening and Listl et al. [21] for dental care,
we explain (part of) the intercountry differences through
the introduction of institutional features that are specifi-
cally related to the prevention procedures analyzed. These
specific features can be related to the parameters from our
theoretical model. This approach appears more promising
than controlling for general characteristics of a country’s
health care system [18].1
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
First, we introduce the model allowing for different types
of disorders and characteristics of the process of medical
prevention. Next, we derive comparative static results for
the prevention decision. Third, we test the model
hypotheses empirically. Most of our theoretical predictions
are not rejected by the data and this result is robust to
different specifications. The final section concludes and
draws some policy implications.
Model of medical prevention
We propose an expected utility (EU) model that captures
an individual’s decision to participate in medical preven-
tion for a specific disorder. Participation in prevention is
taken to be a binary decision and is pursued when the
expected utility of participation exceeds the expected
utility of non-participation, i.e., DEU[ 0; with
DEU ¼ EUparticipation  EUnonparticipation ð1Þ
In what follows, we further detail this expected utility
model as both participation and non-participation in pre-
vention may lead to multiple potential health states. Rather
than specifying a continuous value for the severity and
survival rate of a disorder, we define several disease
development stages and a binary distinction between fatal
and non-fatal diseases. This simplification allows for a
richer specification of the characteristics of the individual
and the type of prevention. We will first work out the
model for secondary prevention. Then, we will discuss
primary prevention and show how it fits into the same
model.
Secondary prevention
During each period2 t, the individual derives utility u(.)
from income y, general background health represented by
an index h and prevention-specific health m. Utility is
concave in income, with uyðy; h;mÞ[ 0 and
uyyðy; h;mÞ 0. A better general background health cor-
responds to a higher index score h with uhðy; h;mÞ[ 0 and
uhhðy; h;mÞ 0. Variable m represents the severity of the
specific medical disorder for which the prevention proce-
dure is set up.3 It takes one of four discrete values
ð0\e\l\dÞ, ranging from 0, i.e., the individual does not
suffer from the disorder, to d, the terminal stage of the
disorder, in which the disorder cannot be treated anymore.
The values e and l indicate early and late stages of the
disorder, respectively.4 The stages are mutually exclusive.
1 None of the general characteristics used in Jusot et al. [18] turn out
to have a significant effect for the explanation of influenza
vaccination and breast cancer screening.
2 In our model a ‘‘period’’ is defined as the normal amount of time in
which an individual has to choose whether or not to participate in
prevention. For influenza, a period is a 1-year interval, since an
individual will have to decide to participate in prevention every year
before the influenza season starts. For breast cancer screening on the
other hand, the normal screening interval is 2 years. Furthermore, we
assume for simplicity and clarity that this amount of time corresponds
to the period in which a disease can develop into a severe illness that
requires curative care, or in case of a fatal disease might result in
death. While this is true for many diseases such as e.g., influenza, it is
not always the case. The assumption can however be relaxed and our
model adapted so that the prevention period and the period of disease
development do not necessarily coincide. In this section, we drop the
subscript t for notational convenience.
3 A natural interpretation of our model is that h refers to the ‘‘health
flow’’ corresponding to a Grossman-type health capital stock, and that
m refers to a specific health shock. Our model then assumes that the
health (and hence utility) effects of a specific type of shock depend on
its interaction with the general background health level.
4 The terminology ‘‘early’’ and ‘‘late’’ stage is just used as a
convenient shortcut to indicate different levels of severity. Since we
will later restrict ourselves to a two-period model, the timing of the
treatment will not be analyzed in detail.
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The individual believes that she will develop the specific
disorder with probability p. The out-of-pocket costs of
treatment for the individual are ce and cl for, respectively,
early and late stage treatment. They are independent of the
individual’s background health. If treated, the patient is
cured of the illness, but relapse in a later period remains
possible. The prevention behavior of the individual deter-
mines whether the disease develops into early or late stage.
Throughout the main analysis, we impose separability
between utility from income and from health, i.e.,
uðy; h;mÞ ¼ vðyÞ þ wðh;mÞ. This assumption is widely
used in the literature.5 In addition to utility from current
income and health, the individual takes into account future
utility Vtþ1 which depends on the future streams of income
and health. It is discounted with factor b and corrected for
the individual’s mortality risk ðpx;tþ1Þ from any other cause
but the prevention-specific disorder. The general utility
specification that will reappear in each health state is then
the following:
vðyÞ þ wðh;mÞ þ bð1 px;tþ1ÞVtþ1 ð2Þ
Our two-dimensional representation of health allows us
to distinguish between different disorders in terms of their
interaction with the general background health status. As
will be explained later, we assume that the occurrence of a
disorder (a shock) does not have a lasting effect on the
background health h in later periods if the disease is treated
(and hence cured). At the moment of the shock, three types
of disorders can be distinguished. The classification of
different diseases in one of the three categories is ulti-
mately an empirical matter, but we illustrate the three types
with typical examples.
Complements Consider first the case of a minor medical
problem, which does not strongly affect the background
health of the individual: dental caries is an obvious
example. In this case, it is natural to assume that ‘‘quality
of the teeth’’ matters more for healthier individuals. This is
represented in our model by
whðh;m1Þ\whðh;m2Þ; 8h if m1[m2 ð3Þ
Comorbidities In the case of comorbidities, the occur-
rence of the disease has a stronger effect on health if
background health is worse. A good example is influenza,
since a healthy individual will suffer less from it than a sick
individual, and runs a smaller risk of complications. If the
utility loss due to the disorder is mitigated by a better initial
health, this results in
whðh;m1Þ[whðh;m2Þ; 8h if m1[m2 ð4Þ
Independence In principle, it is also possible that the
effect of the new disorder is largely independent of the
initial overall health status, resulting in
whðh;m1Þ ¼ whðh;m2Þ; 8h;m1;m2: ð5Þ
Perhaps an extreme diagnosis like that of a life-threat-
ening cancer could be an example of independence,
although in many cases comorbidities would be relevant
for cancer also.
Potential health states in case of non-participation
The default situation is one where the individual does not
participate in preventive care. Ex ante, she believes with a
probability 1 p that she will be healthy and with a
probability p that she will be hit by the disorder. In the
latter case, the disease will develop to the late stage, and
there are two options. Either the disease is non-fatal and
can be cured with treatment at a cost cl, or the disease is
fatal and cannot be cured (e.g., certain cancers), resulting in
the individual’s death. When the individual dies, we
assume that she no longer benefits from current or future
income. To that end, we introduce an indicator function
I(nf) that equals 1 if a disease is non-fatal and turns to 0 for
fatal diseases. The expected utility in the non-participation
case can therefore be written as
EUnonparticipation ¼ 1 pð ÞuHE þ p uS; ð6Þ
where the utilities in the healthy (HE) and sick (S) states
are given respectively by
uHE ¼ vðyÞ þ wðh; 0Þ þ bð1 px;tþ1ÞVtþ1 ð7Þ
uS ¼ Iðnf Þ½vðy clÞ þ wðh; lÞ þ bð1 px;tþ1ÞVtþ1 ð8Þ
Potential health states in case of participation
Secondary prevention allows early treatment of the disease
ðm ¼ eÞ at a lower cost of treatment ce\cl. Take breast
cancer screening as an example. In the typical case,
mammograms are used as screening technology. There are
alternatives, such as self-examination of the breasts or
examination of the breasts by the general practitioner (GP)
or a more invasive breast tissue biopsy. Every screening
technique entails different monetary, psychological (e.g.,
distress), physical (e.g., pain) and transaction costs (e.g.,
waiting and travel time). On the other hand, prevention can
also induce positive emotions such as reassurance or relief.
We indicate the intensity of the preventive procedure by
5 Income can be used for consumption goods that are complements to
good health, e.g., travel, or substitutes for good health, e.g., assistance
with self-care or a guide dog for the blind. The existing empirical
results with respect to the sign and the magnitude of the cross-effect
between health and income (or consumption) are inconclusive [14].
The results for the unrestricted utility function u(y, h, m) are available
from the authors on request.
Differing types of medical prevention appeal to different individuals
123
a[ 0, the out-of-pocket monetary cost by ca and the
psychic costs (net of psychic benefits) by f(a) (with
of ðaÞ
oa [ 0).
If the test is positive, the early treatment is started.6 A
true negative test rightly shows that an individual does not
suffer from the disorder. In the case of a false-negative
result, i.e., if the disorder is present but remains undetected,
individuals end up in the late or terminal stage. The utility
consequences of these different potential health states are
as follows:
uP ¼ vðy ca  ceÞ þ wðh; eÞ þ bð1 px;tþ1ÞVtþ1  f ðaÞ
ð9Þ
uTN ¼ vðy caÞ þ wðh; 0Þ þ bð1 px;tþ1ÞVtþ1  f ðaÞ
ð10Þ
uFN ¼ Iðnf Þ½vðy ca  clÞ þ wðh; lÞ þ bð1 px;tþ1ÞVtþ1  f ðaÞ
ð11Þ
where the superscripts P, TN, and FN refer to ‘‘positive’’,
‘‘true negative’’ and ‘‘false negative’’, respectively.
The probabilities of ending up in the different health
states depend on the effectiveness of the prevention pro-
gram as measured by the test sensitivity ðse 2 ½0; 1Þ. Test
sensitivity is defined as the probability that a test will be
positive for an ill individual and can be expressed in terms
of the numbers of positive ðNPÞ and false-negative tests
ðNFNÞ:
se ¼ N
P
NP þ NFN ð12Þ
If the screening test gives perfect information we have
NFN ¼ 0 and se ¼ 1.
We can then write the probabilities to end up in a certain
health state in terms of p and se:
pP ¼ p se ð13Þ
pTN ¼ ð1 pÞ ð14Þ
pFN ¼ pð1 seÞ ð15Þ
If we combine the utility pay-offs and probabilities, we can
formulate the expected utility in case of participation in a
preventive care program:
EUparticipation ¼ p se uP þ ð1 pÞuTN
þ pð1 seÞuFN ð16Þ
The full model
The individual will participate in prevention if DEU[ 0;
with
DEU ¼ EUparticipation  EUnonparticipation
¼ p se uP þ pð1 seÞuFN
þ ð1 pÞuTN  p uS  ð1 pÞuHE
ð17Þ
¼ p se uP  uFN þ p uFN  uS 
þð1 pÞ uTN  uHE  ð18Þ
It is useful to consider the preference ranking of the dif-
ferent states. For most realistic values of f(a), i.e., if psy-
chological costs and distress due to prevention exceed
psychological benefits from reassurance, and preventive
care costs are not excessive, it is clear from Eqs. (7)–(11)
that uHE[ uTN [ uP, and that uS[ uFN . It is sufficient to
assume that uP[ uS to get a full ranking. For fatal diseases
(with uS ¼ 0), this assumption boils down to the innocuous
premise that taking an effective preventive action to avoid
death yields a positive utility outcome ðuP[ 0Þ. For non-
fatal diseases, we derive from Eqs. (8) and (9):
uP  uS ¼ ðy ca  ceÞ  vðy clÞ
þ wðh; eÞ  wðh; lÞ  f ðaÞ ð19Þ
A positive value implies that the utility gain due to early
discovery and treatment instead of late treatment is larger
than the psychological costs related to prevention. In that
case, we can conclude that:
uHE[ uTN [ uP[ uS[ uFN ð20Þ
If we accept Eq. (20), the first term in Eq. (18) is positive
and represents the utility gain from a correct diagnosis and
early preventive effort. Increasing sensitivity se leads to
more effective prevention, and hence to a utility increase.
The second and third term, on the other hand, are obviously
negative. The second term indicates the utility loss due to a
wrong screening diagnosis. The third term represents the
utility loss for a healthy person when participating in
prevention.
There are, however, two extreme cases: always-com-
pliers and never-compliers. Some individuals enjoy pre-
vention and will always comply. This is the case if
psychological benefits exceed psychological costs and
monetary prevention costs are limited. In this case
uP[ uFN [ uS and uTN [ uHE, so that all three terms in
Eq. (18) turn positive. On the other hand, it is possible that
6 After a positive test result, a more conclusive second test (e.g.,
breast tissue biopsy) can reveal that the disorder was falsely suggested
in the first round while the individual does not have the disorder. This
is defined in the literature as a false-positive test. The frequency of
false-positive results is captured by the test specificity, which is the
probability that the test yields a negative result for an individual
without the disorder. In order to simplify our analysis we abstract
from the possibility of a second screening round. The results from a
more complete model are similar. They can be obtained from the
authors on request.
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for some individuals, the psychological costs are pro-
hibitively high, so that uS[ uP[ uFN . This implies that
p uS[ p se uP þ pð1 seÞuFN and that the expec-
ted utility from prevention given by Eq. (17) is always
negative. These individuals never comply with prevention.
We exclude the extreme cases from the further analysis.
Primary prevention
The aim of primary prevention (for example immunization
or Aspirin use to prevent cardiovascular diseases) is not to
detect and treat a disease in its early stages but to reduce
the probability of developing a disorder. The expected
utility for non-participation in prevention is identical to the
specification in Eqs. (6–8). In case the individual partici-
pates in primary prevention, two potential health states
exist: the individual can either become sick or remain
healthy. The former occurs when the preventive technology
is not effective (NE). A sick patient will be referred to late-
stage treatment (or will die if the disease is fatal). The
utility pay-off and the probability of ending up in this state
are:
uNE ¼ Iðnf Þ  ½vðy ca  clÞ þ wðh; lÞ
þ bð1 px;tþ1ÞVtþ1  f ðaÞ
ð21Þ
pNE ¼ pð1 ef Þ ð22Þ
where ef is a parameter that denotes the effectiveness of the
primary preventive technology.
Alternatively, the individual remains healthy when she
is not affected by the disease or when the preventive
technology effectively protected her from contracting the
disease. The utility pay-off and the probability of ending up
in this effective state (E) are:
uE ¼ vðy caÞ þ wðh; 0Þ þ bð1 px;tþ1ÞVtþ1
 f ðaÞ ð23Þ
pE ¼ 1 pð1 ef Þ ¼ ð1 pÞ þ p ef ð24Þ
These expressions are very much in line with the specifi-
cations we have used to model secondary prevention.
Eqs. (21) and (23) are identical to Eqs. (11) and (10),
respectively, i.e., uNE ¼ uFN and uE ¼ uTN . If we reinter-
pret the sensitivity parameter for secondary prevention as
the effectiveness parameter for primary prevention, i.e.,
if we take se ¼ ef 7, it follows that pNE ¼ pFN and
pE ¼ pTN þ pP. In fact, the main difference between both
types of prevention is that the positive test state with early
treatment for secondary prevention is replaced by the true
negative state in case of primary prevention. The expected
utility for participation can then be written as follows:
EUparticipation ¼ ð1 pÞ þ p ef½ uE
þ pð1 ef ÞuNE ð25Þ
¼ pTN þ pP uTN þ pFNuFN ð26Þ
From Eq. (20), we know that uTN [ uP. The replacement
of uP by uTN in Eq. (26), shows that, ex ante and ceteris
paribus, in comparison with secondary prevention, primary
prevention makes it possible to realize an additional utility
gain of the order pP uTN  uPð Þ.
Comparative statics of the prevention decision
Individuals that do not expect to die in the immediate
future will be confronted with multiple decision moments
to participate in preventive care for a given disease. The
same decision problem will return in each period until the
uncertain moment of death. This means that the individual
decides whether or not to participate in prevention in the
current period, taking into account future utility and future
preventive effort. To model this full process within a multi-
period setting is mathematically burdensome. We therefore
focus on a simplified two-period model that is sufficient to
yield the main insights.8
We assume that the individual lives during two periods
and dies at the end of the second period.9 In period 1, she
decides whether or not to participate in the preventive
program, while in period 2, she does not participate in
prevention and simply gets utility from income and health.
The expected utility in period 2 is unaffected by individual
behavior and is characterized as follows:
V2 ¼ ð1 p2Þ vðy2Þ þ wðh2; 0Þ½ 
þ I nfð Þp2 vðy2  clÞ þ wðh2; lÞ½ 
ð27Þ
Implementing the decision rule, Eq. (1), for the first period
gives for secondary prevention:
DEU1 ¼p1  se½vðy1  ca  ceÞ þ wðh1; eÞ
þ bð1 px;2ÞV2
þ ð1 p1Þ vðy1  caÞ  vðy1Þ½   f ðaÞ
þ Iðnf Þ½p1 vðy1  ca  clÞ  vðy1  clÞð Þ
 p1  seðvðy1  ca  clÞ þ wðh1; lÞ
þ bð1 px;2ÞV2Þ
ð28Þ
7 Of course, this just means that the two parameters play the same
role in both models, not that their numerical values are identical when
comparing different procedures.
8 Results for a many-periods model can be obtained from the authors
on request. If there are more periods, the issue of adherence to a
prevention strategy can, in principle, become relevant (see, e.g., [10,
19]).
9 If Iðnf Þ ¼ 0, the patient dies at the end of the first period.
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and for primary prevention (with se ¼ ef ):
DEU1 ¼ p1  se½vðy1  caÞ þ wðh1; 0Þ
þ bð1 px;2ÞV2
þ ð1 p1Þ vðy1  caÞ  vðy1Þ½   f ðaÞ
þ Iðnf Þ½p1 vðy1  ca  clÞ  vðy1  clÞð Þ
 p1  seðvðy1  ca  clÞ þ wðh1; lÞ
þ bð1 px;2ÞV2Þ ð280Þ
Except for the first line, expressions (28) and (280) are
identical. We will now derive the comparative statics for
the effects of the future, of background health and of
income. We discuss briefly the results for the other
parameters.
The future It follows from Eqs. (28) and (280) that
oDEU1
ob
¼ ð1 Iðnf ÞÞp1  se 1 px;2
 
V2 > 0 ð29Þ
oDEU1
opx;2
¼ ð1 Iðnf ÞÞp1  se b V2 6 0 ð30Þ
oDEU1
oV2
¼ ð1 Iðnf ÞÞp1  se bð1 px;2Þ > 0 ð31Þ
The future only influences the prevention decision in the
case of a fatal disease, i.e., if Iðnf Þ ¼ 0. Indeed, with a non-
fatal disease, all the relevant consequences occur in the first
period. For fatal diseases, prevention provides an oppor-
tunity to avoid death and thus increases the probability to
benefit from future utility. Participation in prevention rises
as the present value of the utility gain related to prevention
increases. This happens when the level of future utility V2
or the weight b given to the future increase or the proba-
bility of dying from other causes px;2 decreases.
Remember that we assume that an individual has a
general background health h2 in period 2, irrespective of
being healthy, treated early or late in period 1. This
assumption can be relaxed to have e.g., a lower h2 when
treated late, due to permanent health damage. This leads to
different utility values of V2 depending on the potential
states in period 1. The consequence is that the future might
matter also for non-fatal diseases, and, that the marginal
effects (w.r.t. b; px;2;V2) go in the same direction as
described for a fatal disease.10
Income The partial effect for current income y1 can be
derived from (28) for secondary prevention:
oDEU1
oy1
¼ p1  se vyðy1  ca  ceÞ
þ ð1 p1Þ vyðy1  caÞ  vyðy1Þ
 
þ Iðnf Þ½p1ðvyðy1  ca  clÞ  vyðy1  clÞÞ
 p1  se vyðy1  ca  clÞ ð32Þ
and from (280) for primary prevention:
oDEU1
oy1
¼ p1  se vyðy1  caÞ
þ ð1 p1Þ vyðy1  caÞ  vyðy1Þ
 
þ Iðnf Þ½p1ðvyðy1  ca  clÞ  vyðy1  clÞÞ
 p1  se vyðy1  ca  clÞ ð320Þ
The first two lines in Eqs. (32) and (320) are always posi-
tive. The third and fourth lines are zero for fatal diseases
and can be positive or negative for non-fatal diseases.
Therefore for fatal diseases the overall income effect is
always positive. If the disease is non-fatal, the sign of the
overall income effect depends on the relative size of the
underlying parameters.
A first-order Taylor expansion around y1 allows us to
formulate approximate conditions for oDEU1oy1 to be positive.
The results are summarized in Table 1.11 For non-fatal
diseases, income has a positive effect if the (private)
monetary costs of participation in prevention outweigh the
savings in terms of curative treatment costs. If monetary
costs are larger than monetary benefits, this will have a
negative effect on the incentives for prevention, and, with a
concave utility function, the negative impact will be more
pronounced for poorer persons. This explains the positive
income effect on participation in prevention. If costs are
less than the benefits, an analogous reasoning yields a
negative income effect. The conditions in Table 1 are
easily interpreted. In most realistic cases of secondary
prevention we may expect a positive income effect. If, for
example, curative treatment and early treatment are equally
well covered by health insurance, any monetary cost of
prevention, as minor as it might be, leads to a positive
income effect. In the case of primary prevention, the con-
ditions for a positive income effect are stricter.
We can also draw conclusions about the effect of y2 on
the expected utility gain of taking a preventive test in
period 1. It has a positive effect on participation, but only
for fatal diseases. The obvious intuition is that an income
increase enhances future utility V2 and makes actual pre-
ventive effort more beneficial.
10 Another assumption that influences the comparative statics with
respect to the future is that the frequency of prevention and the period
of disease development coincide. If this is not the case, and e.g.,
prevention is recommended to be taken yearly while the disorder
needs more than a year to develop to the late stage of the disorder, the
prevention decision is taken in period 1 and potential curative
treatment occurs in period 2. The consequence of this discrepancy is
again that the future matters for a non-fatal disease, and that the
marginal effects (w.r.t. b; px;2;V2) go in the same direction as
described for a fatal disease. 11 The details of the calculations are given in ‘‘Appendix 1’’.
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General background health The comparative static
expressions for background health h1 are given by
oDEU1
oh1
¼ p1  se whðh; eÞ  Iðnf Þp1  se whðh; lÞ
ð33Þ
for secondary prevention and by
oDEU1
oh1
¼ p1  se whðh; 0Þ  Iðnf Þp1
 se whðh; lÞ ð330Þ
for primary prevention. The sign of these expressions
depends on the type of illness. An overview of the different
possibilities is given in Table 2. Note that these results
offer an alternative explanation for the finding of Wu [41]
that health has a positive effect on participation in breast
cancer screening and a negative effect on influenza vac-
cination. To explain this discrepancy, Wu pointed at psy-
chological factors such as fear and anxiety, varying
discount rates by health status or differences in GP advice
according to health status. Our model provides an easy
explanation within the context of a standard expected
utility model, based on the type of prevention and the
disease characteristics.12
The effect of future health on participation in prevention
is similar to the effect of future income. A better future
background health makes it worthwhile to pursue preven-
tion in the current period in the case of a fatal disease.
Other parameters The comparative statics for the other
parameters can be found in ‘‘Appendix 2’’. Participation in
prevention is unambiguously increased by lowering com-
plexity (a), by lowering monetary (ca) and psychological
f(a) costs of prevention, by lowering early treatment costs
(ce), and by enhancing the effectiveness of the preventive
technology (se, ef). However as an increase in complexity
(a) at the same time raises monetary costs (ca) and
improves effectiveness (se, ef), the positive and negative
effects on participation should be weighed against each
other. An increase in curative (late) treatment costs has no
effect on preventive behavior for fatal diseases and an
ambiguous effect for non-fatal diseases. For non-fatal dis-
eases, the effect will be positive if the preventive tech-
nology is effective and the monetary costs of prevention
are low, since in this case prevention provides a good
alternative to curative treatment. A similar conclusion can
be drawn for risk perceptions p1. They have a positive
effect on participation for fatal diseases, but an ambiguous
effect for non-fatal diseases, which will be positive for
effective preventive procedures with low monetary costs.
Empirical analysis
For our empirical illustration, we analyze six types of
disorders and their corresponding preventive care options:
breast cancer, dental caries, influenza, hypertension,
hypercholesterolemia and diabetes. In the next subsection
we briefly describe the disorders and summarize the cor-
responding behavioral hypotheses. We then present the
available data used in the empirical analysis. Finally, we
present the results.
Setup of the empirical exercise
Six procedures
Breast cancer: fatal disease, secondary prevention,
comorbidities or independence in health Breast cancer is
the most common cancer among European women. It
accounts for almost one in three new cancer cases and one
in six cancer deaths. One in nine women develops breast
cancer at some point in her life, and this fraction has
increased over the years. It is possible to detect breast
cancer and the chances of survival increase the earlier the
cancer is treated. For this reason, many countries have set
up a preventive screening program. Given the nature of
breast cancer, we assume that late treatment of cancer
results in death during the period.13
Table 1 Taylor conditions for positive income effect of y1 on participation in period 1
Disease type Fatal disease Non-fatal disease, primary prevention Non-fatal disease, secondary prevention
Taylor condition y1 Always positive effect ca p1  se cl ca p1  se ðcl  ceÞ
Table 2 The expected effect of health on preventive action according
to disease and prevention type
Disease type Fatal disease Non-fatal disease
Complements h and m Positive Positive
Comorbidities h and m Positive Negative
Independence h and m Positive No effect
12 Similar arguments are given in Maurer [22] and Mullahy [23].
13 The American Cancer Society [1] distinguishes between 4 cancer
stages. If breast cancer is detected and treated early (stage 1 or 2), the
5 year survival rate is nearly 100 %, whereas survival rates drop to
20 % if cancer is detected in stage 4.
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Dental caries: non-fatal disease, secondary prevention,
complements in health The setup of preventive dental care
is as follows. An (asymptomatic) individual visits the
dentist preventively (without feeling pain or having dental-
related problems). The dentist screens for dental caries and
dental plaque. If the dentist observes irregularities action is
undertaken. In the case of no prevention or a false-negative
result, there will be curative treatment of the advanced
dental problem. No government organized large scale
preventive care programs exist and dental policies vary
widely across European countries [38].
Influenza: non-fatal disease, primary prevention,
comorbidities in health Influenza vaccination is one of the
best-known and most studied examples of primary pre-
vention. Influenza is a very common infectious disease that
causes general discomfort for most and death for some. In
the latter case, death is often the result of a weakening of
the immune system caused by influenza and an additional
infection, e.g., pneumonia. The US Centre for Disease
Control and prevention (CDC) estimates that each year on
average 5–20 % of the population suffers from seasonal
influenza. The death rate from influenza in the period
1976–2007 is estimated between 1.4 and 16.7 deaths per
100,000 persons [31]. When combining this information, it
is clear that the case fatality risk, which is the risk of dying
when infected (or 1 Iðnf Þ in our model), is far less than
1 %.14 Therefore, we consider seasonal influenza to be a
non-fatal disease.
Since the disease is infectious, immunization brings
about positive externalities. Most developed countries
provide subsidized vaccination programs for certain vul-
nerable groups within the population, such as chronically
ill individuals or the elderly. In addition to government
programs, a number of companies also provide vaccination
programs.
Hypertension: non-fatal disease, secondary prevention,
comorbidities in health Hypertension refers to chronic high
blood pressure. In the US, 41 and 55 % of non-institu-
tionalized individuals aged above 45 or 65, respectively,
indicate to suffer from hypertension in 2012 [3]. Hyper-
tension by itself is not life threatening and can be con-
trolled and treated through dietary and lifestyle changes
and/or medication. In combination with smoking, drinking
or other chronic conditions, such as hypercholesterolemia
and diabetes, the risk of dying from cardiovascular diseases
increases strongly.15 Therefore, we assume comorbidities
in health. There are two types of screening. First, indi-
viduals with a previous diagnosis of high blood pressure or
of a cardiovascular condition are screened to follow closely
their health status and evaluate the effects of treatment
against hypertension. Second, asymptomatic individuals,
i.e., individuals without increased risk for hypertension or
cardiovascular diseases, have the possibility to oppor-
tunistically measure their blood pressure, e.g., as part of a
medical check-up by the GP. Our model is relevant for the
latter type of screening.
Hypercholesterolemia: non-fatal disease, secondary
prevention, comorbidities in health Hypercholesterolemia
refers to chronic high levels of cholesterol in the blood. In
the US, 45 and 54 % of the individuals aged above 45 or
65, respectively, suffered from high cholesterol levels or
took cholesterol-lowering medication between 2009 and
2012 [24]. High cholesterol levels put an individual at risk
for, amongst other, heart diseases. Cholesterol levels can be
lowered mainly by medication. There are no direct signs or
symptoms of high cholesterol, so that screening, by means
of a simple blood test, is required to ascertain its presence.
As for hypertension, we focus on opportunistic screening
by asymptomatic individuals.
Diabetes: non-fatal disease, secondary prevention,
comorbidities in health Diabetes is a chronic disease that
occurs when the pancreas does not produce enough insulin,
or when the body cannot effectively use the insulin it
produces, leading to high blood glucose levels. High blood
glucose levels for prolonged periods cause damage to
blood vessels, nerves and other tissues. This can lead to
serious health complications such as cardiovascular dis-
eases, stroke, blindness and kidney failure, especially in
combination with disturbances in lipid metabolism,
hypertension and smoking. The effects of diabetes can be
mitigated for a substantial period of time by adjusting the
diet, physical exercise, a healthy lifestyle, insulin injections
and other medication. In our analysis, we focus on
opportunistic screening by asymptomatic individuals.
Hypotheses and empirical specification
Participation in prevention is a discrete decision. In our
theoretical model we assumed that individual i participates
if DEUi1[ 0, with DEU
i
1 given in Eqs. (28) and (28
0).
Adding a stochastic component ei capturing idiosyncratic
factors, missing variables and measurement errors, we can
write the probability of participation as
14 It should be noted however that mortality varies substantially by
influenza virus type and age group. Most of the influenza- and
pneumonia-related deaths occur among adults aged 65 or more.
Hadler et al. [15] suggest case fatality rates per age group for seasonal
influenza of 0.001–0.004 % in the age group of 0–17 years olds,
0.003–0.011 % for adults between 18 and 64 and 0.11–0.44 % for
those aged 65 or more.
15 Cardiovascular diseases are the main cause of death in Western
countries. In the US, the incidence of heart diseases in 2012 is 18 and
30 % for non-institutionalized individuals aged above 45 and 65,
respectively [3]. The mortality rate over the entire population in 2010
is 0.5 and 1.2 %, for individuals aged above 45 and 65, respectively
[24].
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Pði participatesÞ ¼PðDEUi1 þ ei[ 0Þ
¼PðDEUi1[  eiÞ:
If we assume the random term to be normally distributed,
this results in a standard probit model. The comparative
static hypotheses about DEU1, as derived in the previous
section, can then be rephrased directly as hypotheses on the
probability of participation.16
To keep track of our theoretical predictions, it may be
convenient to look at Table 3, summarizing the hypotheses
for the empirical cases that will be analyzed.
Data
Individual microdata are taken from SHARE. For breast
cancer screening and influenza vaccination, we combine
the microdata from SHARE with information from mac-
rosources about the specific features of the prevention
programs in the different countries. Table 4 gives an
overview of the relevant data and shows how they are
related to the variables in our theoretical model. Descrip-
tive statistics are provided in Table 7 in ‘‘Appendix 3’’.
Individual data Our individual data come from the first
(2004–2005) and second (2006–2007) waves of SHARE
(version 2.5.0). SHARE is a micro-dataset, targeted at
individuals aged 50 years and over (plus spouses). It covers
more than 30,000 non-institutionalized individuals from 14
European countries and Israel. A household is selected in a
random procedure, but with the specific requirement that at
least one individual is aged 50 years or over. A full
description can be found in [4].
The dependent variables are binary variables that equal
1 if the individual has had a specific type of prevention in
the last (two) year(s). The type of procedures include
mammograms for women, preventive dental care,17 influ-
enza vaccination, blood cholesterol test, blood pressure test
and blood sugar test. Reported participation rates for our
subsamples are 55, 42, 33, 52, 68, and 54 %, respectively.
Data on participation in breast cancer screening and
influenza vaccination were collected through a self-ad-
ministered drop-off questionnaire. For breast cancer
screening, we restrict our sample to women without a
history of breast cancer. Since no respondent received the
drop-off questionnaire in both waves, we are limited to a
pooled cross-sectional analysis for breast cancer screening
and influenza vaccination. In the case of dental prevention,
an important number of individuals answered the question
on participation in both waves. We account for this by
pooling all observations while clustering error terms at the
individual level. With respect to blood pressure, cholesterol
and sugar tests, individuals are asked whether or not in the
past year they were tested by a doctor or a nurse. This
question was only surveyed in wave 2 through a self-ad-
ministered drop-off questionnaire.18 We focus on oppor-
tunistic screening by asymptomatic individuals, and
exclude individuals with heart conditions and diabetes for
Table 3 Overview of the theoretical hypotheses
Effect on participation in
prevention (period 1)
Disorder
F, SP, Indep. (e.g.,
breast cancer)
NF, SP, Compl. (e.g.,
dental caries)
NF, PP, Comor.
(e.g., influenza)
NF, SP, Comor. (e.g., hypertension,
diabetes, hypercholesterolemia)
Decrease h1 Negative Negative Positive Positive
Increase y1 Positive Ambiguous (likely
positive)
Ambiguous (likely
positive)
Ambiguous (likely positive)
Increase px;2 Negative No effect No effect No effect
Decrease a; ca Positive Positive Positive Positive
Increase p1 Positive Ambiguous (likely
positive)
Ambiguous (likely
positive)
Ambiguous (likely positive)
F fatal, NF non-fatal, SP secondary prevention, PP primary prevention, Compl. complements, Comor. comorbidities, Indep. independence
16 Belkar et al. [2] show that neglecting to distinguish between
‘‘aware’’ and ‘‘unaware’’ individuals may lead to a selection effect.
However, they also show that the problem is not very serious if
‘‘censoring is modest and positive dependence between awareness
and choice is substantial’’ (p. 44). This is likely to be the case with
our data.
17 We set preventive dental care equal to one if individuals reported
visiting a dentist in the last 12 months for preventive use or
prevention and treatment combined. The value is set to zero if the
individual has not seen a dentist or has seen him/her only for
treatment. Our empirical results are similar when using an alternative
specification with a value equal to one if the dentist is contacted for
prevention use only and zero otherwise.
18 All other SHARE data discussed below were collected using a
computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) program. A self-
administered drop-off questionnaire can be biased, since lower socio-
economic groups tend to be underrepresented. Therefore, the answers
to the drop-off questionnaire might not be representative of the
population. However, Jusot et al. point out that prevalence rates
obtained in the drop-off questionnaire correspond to available
published OECD population data for most countries [18].
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the subgroups of blood pressure and cholesterol screening.
Furthermore, we exclude individuals with a history of
hypertension or hypercholesterolemia, respectively, for the
subgroup of blood pressure and cholesterol screening, as
well as individuals who take specific medication for the
disorder. For blood sugar screening, we exclude individuals
with a history of diabetes or who use medication for
diabetics.
As for the explanatory variables, we are particularly
interested in variables that allow us to distinguish between
the different disease and prevention combinations, i.e.,
health status and mortality risk. We supplement these with
an income variable and various control variables.
SHARE contains subjective and objective health infor-
mation. Self-assessed health is represented by four dummy
variables, reflecting different perceived health levels: poor,
fair, good, and, very good/excellent. In addition, we use
two indices that capture a part of an individual’s general
background health in a more objective way: an index of
limitations to six activities of daily living,19 and an index
of limitations in mobility related to health.20 For each
limitation a score of 1 is awarded. Subsequently the sum of
all relevant limitations is rescaled (by the total number of
potential limitations) to a value between 0 and 1. Fur-
thermore, we have information on the BMI and a score for
the grip strength of the individual (ranging from 0 to 100).
We use the average score out of two measurements with
the individual’s dominant hand.
The mortality risk (px;2) is captured by one question:
‘‘What are the chances that you will live to age X or
more?’’. Age X is predetermined and depends on current
age, e.g., for all individuals aged 65 or less, age X is set at
75, for individuals aged between 66 and 70, age X is fixed
at 80, etc. To make mortality risk comparable across
individuals, we estimate the probability of dying in the next
10 years using a Weibull specification to model longevity
[17, 39]:
Fðx; k; kÞ ¼ 1 e xkð Þ
k ð34Þ
with k the shape parameter or death rate, x the time to
death, and k the scale parameter. With the survival prob-
ability (1 Fðx; k; kÞ) and two age points, i.e., current age
and age X, we can compute x and either k or k. In absence
of additional information on survival probability (e.g., for
another time span), we need a priori information on one of
these two parameters. Longevity analysis using a Weibull
specification suggests a death rate k between 4 and 10 for
individuals aged between 50 and 100 years [35, 39].
Therefore, in our empirical analysis we use k ¼ 7 as the
baseline death rate and perform a sensitivity analysis for
k 2 ½4; 10. The Weibull specification cannot meaningfully
deal with certain survival probabilities of 0 or 100 %.
However, since nobody can predict survival with certainty,
Table 4 Overview of the data
Data Disorder
Breast cancer Dental
caries
Influenza Other
disorders
h1 Subjective health status
Objective health variables: ADL, mobility, BMI, grip strength
y1 Equivalent household income, broadly defined
px; 2 Mortality risk over period of 10 years
a; ca Belonging to country target group for screening Belonging to country target group for
influenza
Probability of receiving an invitation letter Free or subsidized vaccination
Population-based program completed
p1 Belonging to country target group for screening Dentures Belonging to country target group for
influenza
Past cancer diagnosis Trouble
biting
Age- and country-specific breast cancer incidence and
mortality rates
Control
var.
Education, nationality, gender, age, partner, smoker, house owner, country dummies by wave
19 The activity questions that are used (yes/no): are you able
to... dress?, walk across a room?, bathe or shower?, eat?, get in and
out of bed? use the toilet?
20 The mobility questions that are used (yes/no): Are you able
to... walk 100 m?, get up from a chair after sitting for long periods?,
climb stairs?, reach your arms above shoulder level?, carry weights
over 5 kg?
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we adjust ‘certain’ survival probabilities of 0 and 100 % to
slightly uncertain probabilities of 0.01 and 99.99 %. A
similar approach has been followed in [28].21
Income is interpreted as equivalent household income
(using the square root equivalence scale), comprised of
labor and retirement income as well as income from wealth
(dividends, rental income etc.). We use reported (not
imputed) income data and filter out households with zero or
extremely high reported income. All amounts are expressed
in euros using the exchange rates provided by SHARE, and
subdivided into deciles across the different European
countries (separately for each wave).22
There are a limited number of variables that relate to risk
of a specific disorder. In the empirical analysis of breast
cancer prevention, we take up an indicator for whether or not
the individual has had a positive cancer diagnosis (other than
breast cancer) in the past. We believe that this experience
will increase the subjective belief (and/or objective risk) of
developing breast cancer. The model for dental prevention is
enlarged with a variable indicating whether or not the indi-
vidual experiences biting problems and has dentures.
Control variables used in the empirical model are age (in
classes of 5 years); education (based on ISCED-97
scale);23 dummies for gender, partner, house owner,
nationality (native, EU-citizen or non-EU citizen), (past)
smoker; and country dummies by wave. These control
variables capture elements of awareness, prevalence, need,
future utility, subjective beliefs and risk aversion.
Macro data Country dummies capture the effect of inter-
country variation, but remain a black box with respect to the
underlying causes.While they are necessary when comparing
countries (and are also present in our model), we enrich the
SHARE data with information about health policies and
health indicators from other sources. These can be seen as
rough and partialmeasures of a and ca. The additional data are
not individual specific but group or region specific. Due to
missing data or lack of comparable information on health
policies, Israel and Switzerland are left out of the analysis and
only data from the 13 remaining countries are used (Austria,
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Swe-
den). Since we keep the full set of country dummies in the
model, the effects of all these additional policy and health
variables are identified through the within-country variation.
For breast cancer, the WHO GLOBOCAN project pro-
vides age- and country-specific information on incidence
and mortality rates for 2008 [36]. The rates are expressed
in cases per 1000 individuals. The report on cancer
screening in the European Union provides information on
the type of screening program (population-based or
opportunistic)24 and the implementation status25 [34]. In
Germany, Denmark, and Italy, population-based programs
are administered at a regional level, with varying progress
in program implementation. We include the region-specific
information on the implementation status of the breast
cancer screening program in our dataset. Moreover, von
Karsa et al. provide details on the country target group for
screening and on the chances of receiving an invitation
letter per country [34]. All of this information was matched
with the characteristics of the individuals in our sample.26
21 There exists some doubt as to whether or not the answers to
survival questions have predictive value for real longevity [33].
Moreover, skeptics point at a heaping of responses at focal-point
values of 0, 50, or 100 %, hinting at biased response [6]. On the other
hand, an individual has access to superior information about herself
than is incorporated in a life table. For a discussion, see e.g., [26] or
[43]. Peracchi and Perotti [26] using SHARE data and Smith
et al. [30] using HRS data find evidence that subjective beliefs about
longevity relate to observed survival patterns. For our purpose, it is
not crucial whether or not individual beliefs are an accurate
reproduction of reality, since the prevention decisions of individuals
will be influenced by their subjective beliefs including biases.
22 One of the reasons for using this decile information is that the
income variable is defined differently in waves 1 and 2 of SHARE. In
wave 1 it is reported before taxes and contributions, in wave 2 it is
reported after taxes and contributions. To check the robustness of our
findings we also introduced the two wave-specific income variables as
separate variables in our regressions. In that way, we allow for the
possibility that the income effects are different in the two waves
(possibly because of the change in definition). Our empirical results
and conclusions (see below) remain very similar (results available on
request).
23 We create dummies for highest educational degree: primary
education (ISCED 0–1), lower secondary education (ISCED 2), upper
secondary education (ISCED 3–4), higher vocational education and
university degree (ISCED 5–6).
24 By population-based screening, we refer to an organized screening
program (with a specified target group, a specific screening test,
intervals, quality assurance, monitoring and other procedures) man-
aged by an organization at a national or regional level. In addition to
the high degree of organization, every eligible individual served by
the screening program is individually identified and personally invited
to attend screening. Opportunistic screening on the other hand refers
to screening outside an organized program and without personal
invitation. The initiative to perform a screening examination is taken
either by the individual or the health care provider. Opportunistic
screening may or may not be performed according to the public
screening policy (if one exists), e.g., it may be applied to individuals
outside the targeted population or according to a different screening
technique.
25 It takes time to set up a population-based program. By implemen-
tation status, we refer to the progress made in this process. The
starting point is a planning phase, followed by a pilot project, a rollout
over the entire region/country and finally a completed population-
based screening program.
26 We give some examples. If there are regional differences within a
country (e.g., in implementation status of a screening program), this
information is matched to the individuals living in these different
regions. If a country implements a specific target group (e.g., women
between 50 and 69 years old), a woman in that country belonging to
that target group will get a value 1 for the corresponding variable,
while the other women get a value zero.
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For Spain and Sweden, regional differences in target group
definitions were taken into account.
Information on influenza vaccination policies and
country differences can be found in the publications of the
VENICE project [32].27 Many countries define different
target groups for influenza vaccination based on age (e.g.,
individuals aged 65 and over), on existing illnesses (e.g.,
individuals with chronic lung diseases) and on professions
that have interactions with vulnerable groups (e.g., health
care workers). We replicated the target groups based on the
specific rules for each country. In addition, we distinguish
between three reimbursement schemes: free vaccination,
partially subsidized vaccination, or no subsidies.
Comparable regional or country information for the
other disorders is limited or inaccurate, and is not included.
Results
Table 5 presents the averaged individual marginal effects
of the participation determinants in the prevention of the
different disorders. The analysis is performed on a large
number of individuals: 11,350 individuals for breast cancer
screening, 35,805 individuals for dental prevention of
whom 12,972 have entries in both wave 1 and 2, 21,495
individuals for influenza vaccination, 4029 individuals for
cholesterol screening, 3339 for blood pressure screening,
and 5649 for
blood sugar screening. The analysis confirms results
previously obtained with SHARE for breast cancer
screening and influenza vaccination [18, 29, 42, 43], but
some explanatory and control variables differ to match
better our theoretical model. Of course, since all our data
are basically taken from a cross section (and it is not
possible to find convincing instruments), it would be wrong
to give a causal interpretation to our results. Significant
effects should be interpreted as associations. SHARE tar-
gets individuals aged 50 years and over (plus spouses),
which implies that individuals below 50 years old are by
definition partners and might not constitute a representative
sample of the population. We keep all individuals in our
sample regardless of age, but perform the empirical anal-
ysis also on the subsample of individuals aged 50 and over
(see Table 8 in ‘‘Appendix 3’’). The empirical results and
conclusions are similar.
The results in Table 5 show that a decrease in back-
ground health status, represented by a higher BMI, ADL
index or mobility index and a lower score on grip strength
are either insignificant or have the hypothesized sign. The
pattern that emerges from the self-assessed health dummies
also confirms the hypothesis that a decrease in background
health decreases participation in breast cancer screening
and dental prevention and increases participation in pre-
vention for the other disorders. Even though our results are
to be interpreted cautiously, it is very reassuring that the
inclusion of multiple health variables, capturing divergent
aspects of an individual background health, lead to partial
effects that go in the same direction and that confirm the
hypothesized correlations.
The marginal effects of self-assessed health are most
pronounced for the types of prevention that can be pro-
vided by a general practitioner (GP), i.e., influenza vacci-
nation, cholesterol screening, blood pressure screening, and
blood sugar screening. An alternative explanation for these
results could be that individuals with worse background
health simply visit more often a GP, who might inform
them about preventive actions. In this way, participation in
prevention can be carried out in combination with a visit
for another reason and individuals can be encouraged to
take-up prevention in ways not directly captured in our
model. We test whether this alternative channel is driving
our results in two ways. First, we perform the baseline
analysis on the subsample of individuals who have visited a
GP in the past 12 months (results available on request).
The effects for breast cancer screening, dental prevention
and influenza vaccination are almost identical to the
baseline results. With respect to the different blood tests,
the significant effects among the objective indicators
remain present and indicate that a decreasing health leads
to a higher take-up of the test. The marginal effects of self-
assessed health decrease in absolute value but the pattern
remains visible and significant at a lower significance level.
Second, we introduce two additional explanatory vari-
ables to our baseline specification, i.e., the number of visits
to the GP in the past 12 months and a GP quality index. We
adopt the GP quality index as proposed by Wu¨bker [43].
The GP quality index is not available for all individuals.
Using it reduces the number of observations by more than
60 % for dental prevention, by 22 % for breast cancer
screening and influenza vaccination and by around 8 % for
the other disorders. The results can be found in Table 9 in
‘‘Appendix 3’’. The inclusion of GP visits and GP quality
reduces the point estimates of the marginal effects as well
as their significance levels. Overall, the hypothesized cor-
relations remain present, both for objective health indica-
tors and for self-assessed health. Moreover, the results
show that individuals who visited a GP more frequently in
the past year are significantly more likely to participate in
all types of prevention and that the quality of the GP has a
positive effect on all types of prevention except dental
prevention. These results stand to reason. Introducing the
GP-variables does not alter considerably the overall pattern
for the other variables (the most pronounced change is a
decrease of the income effect for dental prevention).
27 VENICE is an acronym for Vaccine European New Integrated
Collaboration Effort.
N. Bouckaert, E. Schokkaert
123
T
a
b
le
5
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
in
th
e
ta
k
e-
u
p
o
f
p
re
v
en
ti
o
n
:
h
ea
lt
h
,
m
o
rt
al
it
y
ri
sk
,
an
d
in
co
m
e
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
B
re
as
t
ca
n
ce
r
D
en
ta
l
In
fl
u
en
za
C
h
o
le
st
er
o
l
B
lo
o
d
p
re
ss
u
re
B
lo
o
d
su
g
ar
S
cr
ee
n
in
g
P
re
v
en
ti
o
n
V
ac
ci
n
at
io
n
S
cr
ee
n
in
g
S
cr
ee
n
in
g
S
cr
ee
n
in
g
M
ar
g
in
al
ef
fe
ct
s
(S
E
)
M
ar
g
in
al
ef
fe
ct
s
(S
E
)
M
ar
g
in
al
ef
fe
ct
s
(S
E
)
M
ar
g
in
al
ef
fe
ct
s
(S
E
)
M
ar
g
in
al
ef
fe
ct
s
(S
E
)
M
ar
g
in
al
ef
fe
ct
s
(S
E
)
S
el
f-
a
ss
es
se
d
h
ea
lt
h
(R
ef
.
=
ve
ry
g
o
o
d
/e
xc
el
le
n
t)
S
A
H
:
g
o
o
d
0
.0
1
2
(0
.0
1
0
)
-
0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
0
5
)
0
.0
3
8
(0
.0
0
7
)*
*
*
0
.0
8
1
(0
.0
1
9
)*
*
*
0
.0
8
0
(0
.0
1
9
)*
*
*
0
.0
8
1
(0
.0
1
7
)*
*
*
S
A
H
:
fa
ir
0
.0
0
7
(0
.0
1
3
)
-
0
.0
2
3
(0
.0
0
6
)*
*
*
0
.0
7
2
(0
.0
0
9
)*
*
*
0
.0
9
9
(0
.0
2
4
)*
*
*
0
.1
2
3
(0
.0
2
6
)*
*
*
0
.1
0
2
(0
.0
2
0
)*
*
*
S
A
H
:
p
o
o
r
-
0
.0
2
2
(0
.0
2
0
)
-
0
.0
2
4
(0
.0
1
0
)*
*
0
.0
8
9
(0
.0
1
4
)*
*
*
0
.1
3
3
(0
.0
3
6
)*
*
*
0
.1
5
1
(0
.0
4
1
)*
*
*
0
.1
5
8
(0
.0
2
9
)*
*
*
O
b
je
ct
iv
e
h
ea
lt
h
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
A
D
L
in
d
ex
0
.0
7
2
(0
.0
4
3
)*
0
.0
4
0
(0
.0
2
4
)*
0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
3
0
)
0
.0
5
9
(0
.0
9
0
)
0
.0
3
4
(0
.1
1
4
)
0
.1
3
1
(0
.0
6
9
)*
M
o
b
il
it
y
in
d
ex
0
.0
1
3
(0
.0
2
1
)
0
.0
2
6
(0
.0
1
2
)*
*
0
.0
4
6
(0
.0
1
6
)*
*
*
0
.0
5
1
(0
.0
4
6
)
0
.2
0
0
(0
.0
5
6
)*
*
*
0
.0
6
7
(0
.0
3
6
)*
B
M
I
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
0
1
)*
0
.0
0
4
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
0
1
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
0
2
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
0
2
)
0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
0
2
)*
*
*
G
ri
p
st
re
n
g
th
d
o
m
in
an
t
h
an
d
0
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
1
)
0
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
0
)*
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
1
)
0
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
1
)
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
0
1
)
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
o
f
th
e
fu
tu
re
P
ro
b
.
d
ea
th
in
1
0
y
ea
rs
0
.0
6
2
(0
.0
2
6
)*
*
0
.0
1
7
(0
.0
1
2
)
0
.0
1
1
(0
.0
1
6
)
0
.0
1
2
(0
.0
5
7
)
0
.0
8
4
(0
.0
7
0
)
0
.0
4
9
(0
.0
4
4
)
In
co
m
e
(R
ef
.
=
d
ec
il
e
1
)
D
ec
il
e
2
0
.0
2
2
(0
.0
1
9
)
0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
1
1
)
0
.0
3
2
(0
.0
1
6
)*
*
0
.0
1
6
(0
.0
3
2
)
0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
3
3
)
0
.0
3
6
(0
.0
2
8
)
D
ec
il
e
3
0
.0
1
7
(0
.0
1
9
)
0
.0
1
7
(0
.0
1
1
)
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
1
5
)
0
.0
2
3
(0
.0
3
2
)
0
.0
1
6
(0
.0
3
3
)
0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
2
8
)
D
ec
il
e
4
0
.0
0
4
(0
.0
1
9
)
0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
1
0
)
0
.0
0
0
(0
.0
1
5
)
0
.0
5
8
(0
.0
3
4
)*
0
.0
1
3
(0
.0
3
5
)
0
.0
5
3
(0
.0
3
0
)*
D
ec
il
e
5
0
.0
0
4
(0
.0
1
9
)
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
1
0
)
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
1
5
)
0
.0
4
7
(0
.0
3
7
)
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
3
7
)
0
.0
6
7
(0
.0
3
3
)*
*
D
ec
il
e
6
0
.0
4
7
(0
.0
2
0
)*
*
0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
1
0
)
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
1
5
)
0
.0
2
8
(0
.0
3
9
)
-
0
.0
0
7
(0
.0
3
8
)
0
.0
2
3
(0
.0
3
4
)
D
ec
il
e
7
0
.0
3
7
(0
.0
2
0
)*
0
.0
4
1
(0
.0
1
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
2
3
(0
.0
1
5
)
0
.0
2
3
(0
.0
3
9
)
0
.0
1
5
(0
.0
3
9
)
0
.0
2
7
(0
.0
3
4
)
D
ec
il
e
8
0
.0
4
9
(0
.0
2
0
)*
*
0
.0
4
1
(0
.0
1
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
1
9
(0
.0
1
5
)
0
.0
4
9
(0
.0
3
8
)
0
.0
1
2
(0
.0
3
7
)
0
.0
5
6
(0
.0
3
3
)*
D
ec
il
e
9
0
.0
4
4
(0
.0
2
0
)*
*
0
.0
5
3
(0
.0
1
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
2
4
(0
.0
1
5
)*
0
.0
5
9
(0
.0
3
8
)
0
.0
3
8
(0
.0
3
7
)
0
.0
4
6
(0
.0
3
3
)
D
ec
il
e
1
0
0
.0
5
8
(0
.0
2
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
5
3
(0
.0
1
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
2
4
(0
.0
1
5
)*
0
.0
5
7
(0
.0
3
9
)
0
.0
5
1
(0
.0
3
8
)
0
.0
5
7
(0
.0
3
4
)*
B
re
a
st
ca
n
ce
r
sp
ec
ifi
c
D
ia
g
n
o
se
d
ca
n
ce
r
(e
x
ce
p
t
b
re
as
ts
)
0
.0
8
5
(0
.0
2
5
)*
*
*
D
en
ta
l
sp
ec
ifi
c
D
en
tu
re
s
-
0
.1
1
8
(0
.0
0
5
)*
*
*
T
ro
u
b
le
b
it
in
g
-
0
.0
4
9
(0
.0
0
5
)*
*
*
N
o
.
o
f
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
1
1
,3
5
0
4
8
,7
7
7
2
1
,4
9
5
4
0
2
9
3
3
3
9
5
6
4
9
A
v
er
ag
ed
m
ar
g
in
al
ef
fe
ct
s
fr
o
m
p
ro
b
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
ar
e
re
p
o
rt
ed
w
it
h
ro
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
.
F
o
r
d
en
ta
l
p
re
v
en
ti
o
n
,
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
al
le
v
el
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
n
at
io
n
al
it
y
,
g
en
d
er
,
ag
e,
p
ar
tn
er
,
p
as
t
an
d
cu
rr
en
t
sm
o
k
er
,
h
o
u
se
o
w
n
er
,
co
u
n
tr
y
d
u
m
m
ie
s
b
y
w
av
e
D
a
ta
b
a
se
:
S
H
A
R
E
,
w
av
e
1
an
d
w
av
e
2
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
*
p
\
0
.1
0
,
*
*
p
\
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
\
0
.0
1
Differing types of medical prevention appeal to different individuals
123
Also as expected, mortality risk over 10 years is an
important predictor in the model of breast cancer screen-
ing, but has no significant effect on any other type of
prevention. Sensitivity analysis confirms these results. The
signs and significance do not change when we vary the
death rate gradually from k ¼ 4 to k ¼ 8:8. For k between
8.8 and 10, the results are borderline significant with p-
values between 10 and 15 %. Only in the model of blood
sugar tests, an increase in mortality risk over 10 years with
4 k\4:6, slightly decreases the probability of participa-
tion at a significance level of 10 %. However, since
SHARE is oriented towards individuals aged 50 and over,
higher values for k, i.e., a more important increase in the
probability of dying as one ages, are more probable.
Controlling for education levels, we find a positive
effect of income on preventive behavior, although not
always significant. We find that in particular deciles 1 to
3/4 participate less in prevention. The income effects are
most pronounced for breast cancer screening and dental
prevention. The former is again in line with the theoretical
predictions. An alternative income specification, i.e.,
defining income deciles at the country level (by wave),
does not change our results in any important way (results
available on request).
Next, we have individual-specific information that serves
as proxy for (subjective and/or objective) disease risk. We
find that an earlier diagnosis of non-breast cancer increases
the probability of participation in breast cancer screening on
average by 8.5 %-points. Preventive dental care is nega-
tively related to having dentures and having trouble biting.
This is not surprising, since the former probably reduces the
need for regular preventive care, while the latter requires
curative rather than preventive care.
Given that we test the effects of health, income and
mortality risk across multiple prevention types, we may be
confronted with the multiple testing problem, i.e., we run
the risk of rejecting the null hypothesis too frequently. To
correct for this, we applied the Holm–Bonferroni proce-
dure. This method does not change any point estimate, but
uses more stringent conditions to evaluate significance
levels. We group (variable by variable) the preventive care
types for which our hypotheses predict the same effect (see
Table 3) and then apply the Holm–Bonferroni correction to
this group. We give an example: for health variables a first
group includes breast cancer screening and dental preven-
tion for which we expect a negative effect, and the second
group consists in the other prevention types, for which we
expect a positive effect. The correction is applied within
these groups. There are three main findings. First, income
effects are no longer significant for influenza vaccination,
cholesterol, blood pressure and blood sugar screening. This
is, however, still consistent with our income hypothesis.
Second, the effects of the ADL index on all types of pre-
vention and the effect of the mobility index on blood sugar
screening are no longer significant. Third, all other effects
are unaffected. Overall, our main conclusions are con-
firmed even when adhering to more stringent significance
criteria.
In Table 6, we add the additional information from
macrosources to the microdata from SHARE. With the
Table 6 Determinants in the
take-up of prevention: macro
data on policy design
Variables Breast cancer screening Influenza vaccination
Marginal effects (SE) Marginal effects (SE)
Breast cancer specific
Age- and country-specific incidence -0.007 (0.018)
Age- and country-specific mortality 0.141 (0.058)**
Country target group 0.060 (0.024)**
Prob. receiving invitation letter 0.172 (0.023)***
Pop.-based program complete 0.179 (0.021)***
Influenza specific
Country target group based on age 0.079 (0.017)***
Country target group based on illness 0.058 (0.008)***
Subsidized vaccination 0.085 (0.014)***
Free vaccination 0.162 (0.014)***
Averaged marginal effects from probit regressions are reported with robust standard errors. For dental
prevention, standard errors are clustered at the individual level. All regressions control for health, mortality
risk, income, education, nationality, gender, age, partner, past and current smoker, house owner, country
dummies by wave. In addition, the regressions for breast cancer screening includes a dummy for having had
a cancer (except breast cancer)
Database: SHARE, wave 1 and wave 2
Significance levels: * p\ 0.10, ** p\ 0.05, *** p\ 0.01
N. Bouckaert, E. Schokkaert
123
exception of breast cancer incidence, all variables show
very significant positive marginal effects. We observe that
the participation decision is positively affected by age- and
country-specific mortality rates. Breast cancer screening is
higher for individuals who are targeted, who receive an
invitation letter and who live in a country or region that has
fully enacted a population-based program. The probability
of taking up a vaccine increases if an individual belongs to
a target group. Finally, we observe that monetary stimuli
clearly increase the probability of receiving influenza
vaccination, by 8.5 %-points for subsidized vaccination
and by 16.2 %-points for free vaccinations. We conclude
that policy features play a very important role in the take-
up of prevention. They explain some of the intercountry
variation without significantly altering the marginal effects
of health, income, and mortality risk.
Conclusions
We analyzed participation in medical prevention with an
expected utility model. Rather than focusing on one
specific intervention, we aimed to explain the differences
for various prevention procedures within one coherent
model. This model is sufficiently flexible to distinguish
primary and secondary prevention for either fatal or non-
fatal diseases. Moreover, we integrated the idea of different
disease types characterized by a different interaction with
background health. The model yields different predictions
in the different cases. We tested these predictions with
individual data from SHARE and the model performed
surprisingly well.
We believe that the construction of a flexible theoretical
model is useful. It allows us to bring some coherency into
the disparate insights from the empirical literature, and to
validate differentiated hypotheses for different cases.28 In
this respect, the expected utility model (broadly inter-
preted) seems to be an interesting starting point for further
developments. These developments should go in three
directions.
First, our theoretical model can be refined further.
Introducing a richer dynamic structure would make it
possible to integrate past behavior and more sophisticated
expectations into the explanatory framework.29 More fun-
damentally, there are by now sufficient indications in the
literature that the expected utility model cannot explain all
the empirical regularities, not even when it is interpreted—
as in our model—in a purely subjective way, taking due
account of biases in the perception of costs and probabil-
ities. Recent papers in the behavioral economic literature
have built in other realistic features into the analysis of
screening and prevention decisions: hyperbolic discounting
and myopia [7, 12], loss-aversion over changes in beliefs
[13], biased perceptions of risks in a rank-dependent utility
model [11] and anticipatory feelings [25]. While some of
these developments are very promising, it would be overly
ambitious to try to build a general model of different pre-
vention decisions incorporating these mechanisms. For a
comparative exercise, the expected utility model remains a
convenient and flexible starting point. However, it should
be checked how much the more sophisticated behavioral
models add to the explanatory power of an (extended)
expected utility model, especially in cases of primary
prevention and secondary prevention with screening as a
necessary condition for treatment.30
Second, on the empirical side, we lack data on important
parameters such as the subjective rate of time preference or
the subjective perception of probabilities. Future work
should try to collect direct measures of these parameters.31
Using such well-designed measures would allow a more
convincing testing of the hypotheses.
Third, our model can also be used to draw policy con-
clusions. If the individuals perceive the correct values for
all the variables in the model (costs, disease probabilities,
quality of the testing procedure) the decision rule we derive
gives, in principle, the criterion for welfare-optimizing
behavior. However, as mentioned already in the introduc-
tion, there is growing evidence that individuals misperceive
some of these variables. Maximizing ‘‘misperceived’’
expected utility will then lead to suboptimal behavior. Our
results suggest which variables play the most important
role in the real decision-making process of the patients -
and, hence, on which variables the regulator should focus if
she wants to improve social welfare. This approach is
analogous to the one that was followed by Phelps [27] on
the basis of a very similar expected utility model. Rather
than focusing on decisions by the patients (as we do),
Phelps interprets his model as a description of provider
behavior, but he also discusses the effects of potential
errors in the basic underlying variables of the expected
utility model.
Throughout the paper, we have focused on medical
prevention procedures, mainly because participation is
28 A similar position is taken by Howard [16, p. 893].
29 Some authors have used information in the third wave of SHARE
to analyze the influence of reported past behavior in regard to (non-
)participation in breast cancer screening [42, 43] and in dental
prevention [21].
30 The strongest arguments against using the expected utility model
can be found in Oster et al. [25]. However, they analyze medical
testing decisions for Huntington’s disease—where at this moment no
curative treatment is available.
31 Examples in the literature are Bradford et al. [5] for time
preferences and Carman and Kooreman [8] for subjective
probabilities.
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modeled in a binary way, and we analyzed the prevention
of a particular disorder, rather than an improvement of the
general health status. Our model can be extended to include
lifestyle choices, such as physical activity, eating healthy
or (quitting) smoking, as long as the preventive decision
can be defined in a binary way and the disorders that are
prevented can be well delineated.
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Appendix 1: First-order Taylor expansion
We start from Eq. (32) and perform a Taylor expansion
around y1, for secondary prevention, this gives:
oDEU1
oy1
¼ vyðy1Þp1  se vyyðy1Þ½ca
 ð1 p1ð1 seÞÞ þ ce  p1  se
 Iðnf Þ½vyðy1Þp1  se vyyðy1Þ
 ðca  p1ð1 seÞ þ cl  p1  seÞ
and for primary prevention:
oDEU1
oy1
¼ vyðy1Þp1  se vyyðy1Þ cað1 p1ð1 seÞÞ½ 
 Iðnf Þ½vyðy1Þp1  se vyyðy1Þ
 ðca  p1ð1 seÞ þ cl  p1  seÞ
Since vyðy1Þ[ 0 and vyyðy1Þ 0, the effect will always
be positive for a fatal disease. For a non-fatal disease, we
derive the following Taylor condition for secondary
prevention:
oDEU1
oy1
¼ vyyðy1Þ½ca þ p1  se ðce  clÞ
oDEU1
oy1
> 0 , ca > p1  se ðcl  ceÞ
and for primary prevention:
oDEU1
oy1
¼ vyyðy1Þ ca  p1  se cl½ 
oDEU1
oy1
> 0 , ca > p1  se cl
Appendix 2: Comparative static results
Characteristics of the testing procedure
Starting from Eq. (18), we derive for secondary prevention:
oDEU1
ose
¼ p1ðuP  uFNÞ[ 0
where the conclusion about the sign follows from Eq. (20).
An improvement of the effectiveness of prevention, with-
out additional monetary or psychological costs, always
makes prevention more attractive. For primary prevention,
we have
oDEU1
ose
¼ p1ðuTN  uFNÞ[ 0 for ef ¼ se
The comparative static results are straightforward for the
‘‘cost’’ parameters a and ca: We have ou
xx
oz \0, for z ¼
ða; caÞ and for xx ¼ ðP; TN;FNÞ. We therefore conclude
that
oDEU1
oa
\0
oDEU1
oca
\0
As could be expected, increased costs make preventive effort
less attractive. If an increase in a leads to an increase in ca,
the negative effects are reinforced. If, on the other hand, a
policy change increases a, and, at the same time, se, positive
and negative effects should be weighed against each other.
Characteristics of the disease
The effect of a change in p1 is less straightforward. Taking
the derivative of Eq. (17), we get for secondary prevention:
oDEU1
op1
¼ uHE  uTN þ ½se uP
þ ð1 seÞuFN  uS
¼ ½vðy1Þ  vðy1  caÞ
þ se½vðy1  ca  ceÞ þ wðh1; eÞ
þ bð1 px;2ÞV2
þ Iðnf Þ½vðy1  ca  clÞ  vðy1  clÞ
 seðvðy1  ca  clÞ þ wðh1; lÞ
þ bð1 px;2ÞV2Þ
ð35Þ
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which has an obvious interpretation. The relative ranking
of utility states in Eq. (20) shows clearly that if the indi-
vidual is healthy (states uHE; uTN), participation in pre-
vention leads to additional costs and a utility loss, while if
she is ill (states uS; uP; uFN), it depends on the underlying
parameters, such as the costs and the efficiency of the
preventive procedures, whether prevention leads to a gain
or a loss. As p1 increases there is a shift away from the
utility loss when healthy, towards the utility gain or loss
when sick. The former leads to a positive effect on par-
ticipation in prevention, captured by the first term in
Eq. (35), while the latter may result in a positive or a
negative effect on preventive behavior, captured by the
second term in Eq. (35). The positive effect will dominate,
i.e., oDEU1op1 [ 0, for a fatal disease and for preventive pro-
cedures with a high sensitivity se and/or low screening
costs ca. For primary prevention (with ef ¼ se), the partial
effect is similar, but uP is replaced by uTN , which ceteris
paribus leads to a higher marginal effect:
oDEU1
op1
¼ uHE  uTN þ ½se uTN
þ ð1 seÞuFN  uS
We can also draw conclusions about the effect of p2 on the
probability of taking a preventive test in period 1. As noted
before, it will only have an impact for fatal diseases. In that
case, we get from Eqs. (27) and (31) that
oDEU1
op2
¼ p1  se bð1 px;2Þ vðy2Þ þ wðh2; 0Þð Þ\0
The intuition is obvious. Future utility V2 unambiguously
decreases as p2 increases, since the individual is less likely
to be healthy and more likely to be dead. As a result DEU1
decreases and prevention becomes less interesting. This is
in accordance with the conclusions from Eq. (31).32
A last characteristic of the disease is the treatment cost,
represented in the model by ce and cl. Starting from
Eqs. (28) and (280), we get:
oDEU1
oce
¼ p1  se vyðy1  ca  ceÞ 6 0
oDEU1
ocl
¼ Iðnf Þ  p1½vyðy1  clÞ
 ð1 seÞvyðy1  ca  clÞ
An increase in the cost of early treatment only matters
for secondary prevention. It leads to a reduction in DEU1
and, consequently, lowers the incentives for preventive
action. Higher curative (late stage) treatment costs have no
effect for fatal diseases, since no cure is available. For non-
fatal diseases the effect is ambiguous, since the costs can
occur both in case of participation (state uFN) as in case of
non-participation (state uS). However, if se is high enough
and/or ca low, more expensive curative treatment increases
the incentives for preventive effort. That was only to be
expected. Prevention is the only possibility to avoid the
larger cost, but this cost avoidance can only work if pre-
vention is reasonably effective (se high enough) and
screening costs are limited.
Appendix 3: Additional empirical results
See Tables 7, 8 and 9.
32 If the time horizon is longer, as in the multi-period model, the
effects of p2 become more complex (results can be obtained from the
author on request). Given that the individual can choose to participate
in prevention in period 2 as well, she can counter partly the utility loss
due to an increased risk of illness.
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics
Min Max Mean Standard deviation
Breast cancer screening 0 1 0.540 (0.498)
Dental prevention 0 1 0.405 (0.491)
Influenza vaccination 0 1 0.327 (0.469)
Cholesterol screening 0 1 0.532 (0.499)
Blood pressure screening 0 1 0.694 (0.461)
Blood sugar screening 0 1 0.537 (0.499)
Number of GP visits 0 98 4.586 (7.173)
GP quality index 0 1 0.253 (0.234)
SAH: very good or excellent 0 1 0.290 (0.454)
SAH: good 0 1 0.381 (0.486)
SAH: fair 0 1 0.239 (0.427)
SAH: poor 0 1 0.090 (0.286)
ADL index 0 1 0.036 (0.134)
Mobility index 0 1 0.175 (0.268)
BMI 11 78 26.529 (4.436)
Grip strength dominant hand (average of two attempts) 0 91 29.551 (15.006)
Prob. death in 10 years 5.14e08 1 0.122 (0.211)
Age below 40 0 1 0.002 (0.044)
Age between 40 and 44 0 1 0.007 (0.082)
Age between 45 and 49 0 1 0.026 (0.158)
Age between 50 and 54 0 1 0.168 (0.374)
Age between 55 and 59 0 1 0.185 (0.388)
Age between 60 and 64 0 1 0.166 (0.372)
Age between 65 and 69 0 1 0.145 (0.352)
Age between 70 and 74 0 1 0.120 (0.325)
Age between 75 and 79 0 1 0.091 (0.287)
Age between 80 and 84 0 1 0.058 (0.234)
Age 85 and over 0 1 0.033 (0.180)
Gender: male 0 1 0.443 (0.497)
Gender: female 0 1 0.557 (0.497)
Nationality: native 0 1 0.980 (0.140)
Nationality: EU citizen (not native) 0 1 0.012 (0.111)
Nationality: outside EU 0 1 0.007 (0.086)
Has partner 0 1 0.748 (0.434)
Schooling: primary 0 1 0.325 (0.468)
Schooling: lower secondary 0 1 0.179 (0.384)
Schooling: upper secondary 0 1 0.305 (0.460)
Schooling: university 0 1 0.191 (0.393)
House owner 0 1 0.730 (0.444)
Smoked in the past 0 1 0.472 (0.499)
Smokes currently 0 1 0.197 (0.398)
Diagnosed cancer (except breasts) 0 1 0.039 (0.195)
Breast cancer: incidence (per 1000 cases) 0.077 5 2.794 (0.883)
Breast cancer: mortality (per 1000 cases) 0.012 2 0.777 (0.463)
Breast cancer: target group 0 1 0.724 (0.447)
Breast cancer: prob. receiving invitation letter 0 1 0.381 (0.444)
Breast cancer: pop.-based program complete 0 1 0.542 (0.498)
Influenza: target group (age) 0 1 0.528 (0.499)
Influenza: target group (illness) 0 1 0.259 (0.438)
Influenza: subsidized vaccination 0 1 0.334 (0.472)
Influenza: free vaccination 0 1 0.292 (0.455)
Database: SHARE, wave 1 and wave 2
N. Bouckaert, E. Schokkaert
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